W e have all felt th e pain and ang uish o f th e case o f Eli 7. abe th Bou via durin g the pa st three years. A yo un g wo m a n. a 4ua d riplegic. he r bo d y w ill ne \' e r be restored to an y rea sona ble le ve l o f no rmal functi o ning.
Sh e has e x pres sed an int e nse d esire t o a vo id taking a n y n o uri s hment o f an y kind . I n a w ord . s he ha s d ec id ed t o e nd he r li fe b y refus in g t o ta ke a n y ty pe o f food o r no u ris hm e nt. Bo th th e hos pit a ls and th e S upe ri o r C o urt ha d d eclared that s he di d no t ha ve the right to so te rmina te he r li fe .
T he 2nd C ourt o f A ppeal has now rul ed that th e "ri g ht o f pri vacy" a fford s he r full p ro tecti o n in he r d ec isi o n to e nd a ll n o uri s hme nt.
Since the full ruling b y the 2nd Court of Appeal is not a vailable at this writing. it is not poss ible to g ive a full critique of th e issues and the Court's reaso n1l1 g.
But the c on s ist e nt teac hing o f th e C atholi c Churc h has al wa ys ta ug ht us our respons ibiliti es in safegua rding o ur lives. as fo ll o ws: Int e nti o na ll y ca usin g o ne's ow n dea th . o r suicid e. is therefore equall y as wro ng as m urd er: su c h a n act io n o n t he part ora pe rso n is t o he con side red a s a rejec ti o n of (in u' s so\" cn: ign ty a nd itH 'ill t!, pla n. Furth ermo re. sui cidl' is also O ft CIl a rcfu sa l or l oy~ for sdL t h~ d~ni a l of t h~ na tura l in sti nct t(i l i Y~. a !'l ig ht fro m t h~ dut i~s of justice and c har it y owcd to o l1 e's ncig hh or. t o \a ri o ll s com mu n it ies or t o t he \\" ho le of soc iety alth o ug h. as is gl' ll l' rall~' rccog ni/c d. at times the re an: psycho logica l fac tors rr L'~L'l1t t ha t ca ll d imi n ish n:s po nsihil ity 0 1" ('\"(:11 cOl11 r k t d~' I"L' I1Hl \"l' it. I T he 2 nd C o urt o f A ppeal has e nt e red a realm w he re its co mpete nce d o es no t lie . T he gift of li fe is prec io us . and it s a uth o r is God. Eac h o ne o f us is g uardian and cus to dian o f tha t prec io us g ift. and we d o no t have th e " ri g ht" t o e nd o ur life thr o ug h direct acti o n -s uch as re fu s in g t o ea t. T he d oct o rs treating E li n tbe th Bo u via ha \' e maint a ined th a t s he co uld -but wo uld no t -eat so lid foo d. Co nse4 ue ntl y. t hey ha ve ha d to ta ke the initia ti ve in o rd er to prov id e her no u ris hme nt thro ugh for ced fe edin g.
Th e e rr o r of t he 2nd Co u rt o f A ppeal is fo u nd in it s pl a ei ng th e " 4 ualit y o f li fe" as th e prim a ry c rit e ri o n w he re by a pe rs o n li ves o r di es. If th e reaso nin g o f th e Co u rt p reva ils . and a pe rso n is lega ll y pe rmitt ed to e nd Februa ry, 1988 his or her life because they perceive the quality of their life to be inadequate, are we far from the day when others -doctors, family members, judges -may actually "order" the mercy-killing of a person based upon the same logic?
Because of the critical nature of this case, and the future implications flowing from it, I will issue a more detailed analysis and definite guidelines to help guide us as soon as the full decision has been studied.
In the meantime, I ask all the members of our Archdiocese to pray for Elizabeth Bouvia and support her through our love. Her life is precious, she is valuable even if confined to bed and unable to move. She is our sister, and she is a member of our human family. We love you, Elizabeth, and we pray that you will accept our love and support as that strength which you need so very much. 
Extended Statement by Archbishop Roger Mahony on the Unanimous Ruling br the California 2nd Distriel Court of Appeal on the Case of Elizabeth Bouvia
We have all felt the pain and anguish of the case of Elizabeth Bouvia the past few years. A young woman and a quadriplegic, her body will never be restored to normal functioning. Understandably , she finds her life full of disappointment and burden .
Several years ago. she entered a hospital allegedly for treatment. But once there. she refused to eat -an action she was quite capable of at that time , if only someone would put the food into her mouth. She made it plain. moreover. that her refusal was for a suicidal purpose: she simply wanted to end her life of misery.
The hospital authorities sought and obtained a Court order exempting them from allowing this suicidal action to be carried out under their auspices and with their assistance. The Court authorized them to forcefeed her by intubation until she regained enough strength to be discharged from the hospital. Since that time, her bodily powers have further diminished . Nonetheless. she has resumed taking what nourishment she can by mouth , even though she complains that this is becoming increasingly la borious by reason of na usea and vomiting and, by reason of aspiration into her lungs, dangerous . Now in a County hospital. she recently brought su it in a trial Court for the right to terminate intubation newly forced upon her, and to rely only on whatever nourishment she could take by mouth . The trial Court rejected her plea, and she submitted her case to and was upheld by a Court of Appeal. During the appeal, she disavowed what was apparently her goal several years ago: to end her life. She also indicated once again her willingness now to continue to take whatever food she could take by mouth.
Immeasurable Value of Each Individual Life
Any effort , legal or otherwise, to resolve such issues, must begin with our facing the fact that the life of an innocent person cannot be measured against the burden which may inhere in it for that person or for others who must care for him. Thus, human beings have no right to decide that the very life of an innocent human being does not "measure up" properly, and therefore may be terminated as burdensome by omission or commission . This does not at all take away from the fact that we may indeed, and normally shou ld, do all we can surgically, medicinally, and in any other way to eliminate pain and other burdens even if eliminating those burdens results also in a shortening of life.
Laws and judicial processes which ignore this immeasurable value of the life of each and every innocent human individual in reality undermine the very society they are supposed to serve.
For once a society decides that the human life of anyone innocent individual can lose its va lue, and therefore that society should legally establish a person's right to suicide, we question at least implicitly and inevitably -whether we realize it o r not -the value of every person's life.
And for cases of persons which a low "quality of life ," but without enough mental competency (or common sense, some would add) to end their lives, we shall have shack led ourselves to a cha in of log ic which forces us sooner or later to the conclusion that society ought to make the decision .liJl· such persons.
The history of Nazi Germany exemp lifi es that logic , with its e liminati on of thousands of the "feeble-minded," the politically obtuse, and, eventually as many Jews as the Third Reich could get its hands on. One of the German judges, tried at Nuremberg for his part in these "decisions," pleaded that he never knew death sentences based on lack of "quality of life" would come to "that" -the death of millions.
In a well-known dramatization of that trial, the judge appointed by the Allied Nations responded, "Herr Werner, it came to 'that' the day you first sentenced an innocent man." So it is with judges today, as we have seen in our own nation only a few years ago when an "Infant Doe" was refused a commonplace , unburdensome, but life-saving surgery simply because the infant suffered Down's Syndrome. So it is even when one, in basic possession of one's mental powers, sentences one's self to death by way of a decision for suicide. Such decisions, and laws or judgments upholding them, invite both the degradation of individuals and murderous chaos in society.
No Duty to Add Burdens
True , a moral a pproac h which, to the contrary, va lues ea ch human li fe as a pri ce less g ift can n o neth eless justi fy not adding heavi ly to the burd e ns which already fill a pa tient's life. If taking food artificially, or even na turall y, in a patient's ho nest judgment is a so urce o f signifi ca nt pain , di sco mfort. risk or eve n dehumanization added /() what he is already expe ri e ncing or will ex peri e nce from his co ndition , o ne can defend the pat ient's ri g ht to say "No m o re!" This is a reasonable decision wo rth y of a human being, and ninetee n hund red yea rs of co heren tl y developing Christian m o ral thinkin g affirm it.
For it is not a decision to end o ne's ea rthl y life, but t o tole ra te that life's pass ing away (as we all mu st so meday) rather tha n adding nell' burd ens to th ose a lread y prese nt in one's life .
Indeed, society has a ri g ht -eve n an obligation -t o pro tect a patie nt's right t o make this eva lua ti o n of the burd e n in a procedure and decisions which follow from it. eve n thoug h at times others may disagree with a particular pa ti e nt's thinking and choice in th e matter. The o pini o n of Justices Beac h, Rot h and Compton recently made ava ila ble appears at first to contain much which is s upporti ve bot h of th e moral o bliga ti o n not to see k precisely t o end a life and of th e right to refuse procedures prec ise ly because the y significantl y add burd e n. Eli za beth's prese nt willingness to take whatever n o uri shme nt she can ma na ge by mouth (even th o ug h she cannot long survive on this) would indica te prima/acie an intent to d o th e same.
Dangerous Vagueness
Unfortunately, a longside these affirmations we find scattered throu g hout t he Court's opinion ambiguities which could undermine the m. To be sure, these a mbiguities are found m ostly in d eclara tions of public and professio nal policy which the Justices merel y cite. No neth eless, the ambiguit ies remain.
For instance , the pa tient's right to "d ecide" is maintained repeatedl y in th e Court d ec ision [cf. pages 9, 10, II], but it is not a lways clear l1'hat the pa tient has a "right to d ec id e": to ai m to end life? Or merely to tolerate life's ending ra ther than use burdenso me medica l procedures? Whet her or not our legal system has constructed such a "right to d eci de" is, of course, a question for lega l scholars. From the moral a s pect , howeve r, such a lega l "right" is morally good la w if it protects the patie nt's right to discern for himself how seriouslr burdensome a procedure is to him or others -not if the law constructs a " right to decide" precise ly to aim to end one's life whether by omission or commission.
Again,just as a physician has "a commitment ... to susta in life," bUl not by every possi ble mean s, so a lso he has "a commitment ... to ... relieve pain ," [page 17] but again, not by every p ossible m eans. From the moral point of view, efforts aimed precisely at shortening life are among those means which society should rule out. The documents the Justices use, at least in the parts they quote , do not always make this clear.
Invitations to Euthanasia
More serious, in the last third of the text of the Opinion, the Justices suddenly switch signals and begin to appeal only to "quality ollile" considerations. They even allege, without any proof whatsoever, that diminished "quality of life" is the reason behind "all decisions permitting cessation of medical treatment or life-support proced ures" [page 19].
For pages , no mention is made of the burdensomeness of the intubation Ms. Bouvia is rejecting. Appeal is made merely to the "hopelessness, uselessness, unenjoyability and frustration" of her lile in its present condition [page 20]. She considers " her ex istence mea ningless," a nd cannot be faulted for so concluding [page 20]. She must be freed from "the ignomin y, embarrassment, humiliation a nd dehuma ni zing as pects crea ted by her helplessness" [page 21]. "Such a life has been physically destroyed and its quality, dignity and purpose gone" [page 20].
Such remarks would seem to indicate an ideological commitment to euthanasia, and are peculiarly out of place in ajudicial opinion. Not that there is no place for ideology, religion or morality in law. But that place is to be established by the consent of the governed through their constitution or legislature , not by judicial fiat.
What see ms here to be precisely an instance of legislation by judicial fiat incorporates an agnostic skepticism about a God Who gives meaning to life even in one's suffering, and a materialistic view of man as nothing but an animal whose value depends on the condition of his body. Millions of Christians, Jews , and dedicated members of many faiths will find such views repugnant.
Moreover, in imposing this distinctly partisan doctrine about meaninglessness and valuelessness in life, the Justices would seem to ignore or even move to overthrow our perennial legal tradition regarding the State's interest in preventing su icide. That tradition means that if a person is attempting to terminate his life, any society worth the na me "human" will take what reasonable steps it can to stop him. Whether, to what extent, and how such suicidal enterprises can be detected and thwarted can rightly be debated.
The Justices' opinion , however , cannot be read as other than an attempt actually to construct legally a "right to suicide," -to give society'S blessing to a suicidal effort -a nd to authorize (and someday oblige?) medical professionals and others to assist in it. "A desire to terminate one's life is probably the ultimate exercise of one's right to privacy," the Court writes [page 23]. In particular, Justice Compton in his concurri ng opinion seems to reveal and revel in the euthanasic thinking of the Court, and with an obvious logic the other two Justices side-stepped, blatantly argues for suicide, not only by omission , but by commission, that is, by drugs and procedures aimed to kill.
Summary
Society must find a way effectively to recognize both the inviolable sanctity of each innocent human life , and at the same time, the right of a patient not to have additional burdens heaped upon him in the miseries he is already experiencing. To achieve this moral balance, it is necessary to distinguish clearly between , on the one hand, the burdens inherent in the patient's very life , and on the other hand , burdens which a particular procedure will add.
Only such a balanced approach , truly respectful of all that is most profoundly human , would allow for the Elizabeth Bouvias of this world to choose to allow death to come more quickly rather than to be subjected to intubation and other truly burdensome, though life-extending, procedures over a significant period of time.
Thus , while true moralj ustification can be found for Elizabeth's refusal of intubation , any society concerned with a truly and ethically human approach to the problems of the dying must reject the reasoning evidently behind the Court's decision. As Justice Compton notes (approvingly!), that reasoning simply applauds and further extends "the deviation from that part of the oath" of Hippocrates by which physicians have sworn for hundreds of years never to perform abortions [page 2 in his concurring opinion ].
The Court's reasoning is an open invitation to suicide , euthanasia , and worse -perhaps eventually the elimination even of those who do not want to die . As such, it does a profound disservice to society and dramatically weakens society's commitment -to value and protect all human life as a primary goal of the human community.
